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1. Introduction 
With low inflation in the Euro Area taken as a given, a return to steady real GDP 
growth is likely to be the most effective mechanism for restoring Europe’s highly 
indebted governments, businesses and households to sustainable situations. This 
paper examines prospects for growth in the Eurozone. It follows up on an earlier 
paper of ours (McQuinn and Whelan, 2008) that focused on trends up to mid-
2006. While the period of growth in Europe prior to the global crisis of 2008 is 
sometimes referred to as “the boom”, our previous paper had noted that long-
run trends in both productivity and per capita hours worked were deteriorating 
to the point where potential output growth in the Euro Area was at a historical 
low point and apparently on a negative trend. After a long period of catching up 
with US levels of labour productivity, Euro Area productivity growth had, from the 
mid-1990s onwards, fallen significantly behind. 
 
In this paper, we update our calculations from our 2008 paper and provide 
projections of Eurozone growth out to 2060, based on recovery scenarios and 
long-term demographic trends. Because of data restrictions, we restrict our 
analysis to the twelve countries that participated in the Euro Area prior to the 
most recent accessions.2 
 
Overall, our findings are sobering for those expecting economic growth to deal 
with the Euro Area’s debt problems over the next decade. Among the results we 
report are the following:  
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1. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in the Euro Area has almost ground 
to a halt: it averaged 0.2 per cent per year over the period 2000-2013. 
2. The ongoing slump in investment is having negative supply-side effects: 
low capital stock growth is subtracting about 0.6 per cent per year from 
potential output growth. 
3. The working age (15 to 64) population of the Euro Area has been 
declining since 2010. 
4. We project real GDP growth of just over half of one per cent over the 
next decade even if unemployment and investment return to their pre-
crisis rates by 2020. 
 
2. Growth Accounting Framework 
The analytical framework which we use to assess the performance of European 
countries is similar to that outlined in Byrne and McQuinn (2014) and is based 
on the standard assumption that output is produced according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function 
       
   
    
where    is real output,    is capital input,    is labour input (defined in this 
paper as total hours worked), and    is Total Factor Productivity. Output growth 
can then be expressed as 
   
  
 
   
  
  
   
  
       
   
  
 
Using data on output growth, capital growth and labour growth, TFP growth can 
be calculated. As there is no official capital stock series for the European 
economy, we construct this series ourselves. To do this we assume that the initial 
stock of capital in 1970 equals the steady-state value implied by the Solow 
growth model in this year based on the trends at that point for GDP growth, the 
investment share of GDP and the growth rate of labour input. The rest of the 
capital stock series is then derived using the following definition 
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with a depreciation rate of six per cent per annum. For more on the assumptions 
underpinning the growth calculations see McQuinn and Whelan (2007) and 
McQuinn and Whelan (2008).3 
 
3. Historical Assessment and Likely Future Trends in TFP and Labour Supply 
Table 1 presents results for the Euro Area and the US of the growth accounting 
exercise which allocates output growth according to its three components. 
Amongst the trends to emerge from the table is the declining rate of TFP 
growth. Euro Area TFP growth was running at 2.7 per cent in the first half of the 
1970s, fell to 1.6 per cent over 1977-1986, to 1.5 per cent over 1987-1996 and 
to 0.7 per cent over 1997-2006. The period from 2007-2013 has seen TFP 
decline at an average rate of 0.2 per cent per year, mainly due to a 3 per cent 
decline in 2009. In terms of assessing likely future trends in Euro Area TFP, we 
believe that the average growth rate over the period 2000-2013 of 0.2 per cent 
may well represent a reasonable value for the medium-term growth rate. This 
period incorporated a number of years of expansion and falling unemployment 
as well as two periods of rising unemployment so the total cyclical effect on this 
average is probably quite low. 
 
We now turn to labour market developments in the Euro Area. Labour 
productivity and hours worked together determine the path of GDP in any 
economy. Table 2 provides a decomposition of the percentage change in total 
hours worked as a function of four different components: changes in population, 
the participation rate (labour force divided by the total population), the 
employment rate (employment as a fraction of the labour force) and the change 
in average work week per employee. Figure 1 provides graphical evidence of 
related variables. It shows that in the period since 1970, European population 
growth has fluctuated around a relatively low average value of about half of one 
per cent and has gradually fallen over the past decade. Rising female labour 
force participation has driven a significant increase in the fraction of the 
population that is available for work but this series has levelled off in recent 
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years. Offsetting the longer-term rise in participation, the average work week 
has declined steadily and unemployment rates have risen to a much higher 
average value than those recorded in the early 1970s. 
 
Rather than focus in detail on the factors that have driven past fluctuations in 
labour input, we want to focus on the outlook for the future. A number of 
patterns are now in place that point against significant increases in total hours 
worked in the Euro Area economy in the next few decades. 
1. The population of the Euro Area 12 group of countries is expected to 
grow very slowly over the next few decades. Eurostat projections show 
0.18 per cent per year growth in population between 2013 and 2023 
followed by a gradual reduction in population growth until population 
levels begin declining in 2046 (see Figure 2). 
2. More seriously, Eurostat estimate that the Euro Area’s population in the 
normal working-age bracket of 15 to 64 years old peaked in 2010 and is 
set to decline steadily over the next few decades. Eurostat project that 
the population in the 15 to 64 years old bracket will fall at an average 
annual rate of 0.21 per cent in the decade finishing in 2023 and then fall 
at a rate of 0.48 per cent per year in the subsequent decade. 
3. Among those who are in the working-age bracket of 15 to 64 years old, 
the increase in participation rates has gradually tailed off in recent years. 
This represents female labour force participation reaching a plateau in 
many countries but also the effects of population ageing. Participation 
rates fall off as people get closer to the “official” retirement age so the 
ageing of Europe’s population is likely to limit further gains in the 
participation rate.  
 
4. Longer-Run Outlook 
How are these trends likely to shape economic growth in the coming decades? 
Here, we report results from a simulation of a simple supply-side model that 
projects growth using recent trends for TFP, uses the demographic projections 
just described and also assumes an unwinding of the cyclical problems with low 
investment and high unemployment. Everything up to 2013 is taken from 
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historical data, so 2014 is the first year of the simulation. The model’s ingredients 
are described as follows:  
 
       
   
    
                   
                          
        
         
 
The evolution of each country’s capital stock depends on last period’s rate of 
investment which we project as a time-varying ratio of total real GDP. Labour 
input is modelled as a product of the country’s employment rate (1 -   ), the 
participation rate for those in the work-age population, (  ), the working age 
population, (    ) and the average length of the work week (  ). The 
assumptions underlying the simulation are as follows: 
1. TFP growth is assumed to continue to grow at the Euro Area 2000-2013 
average of 0.2 per cent. 
2.  The ratio of investment to GDP is projected to recover to its 1998-2007 
average by 2020 and remain constant thereafter. 
3. The unemployment rate is projected to fall gradually to their 1998-2007 
averages by 2020 and be constant thereafter.  
4. European participation rates of work-age population remains at 2013 
levels.  
5. Despite the downward trend observed in the average work week, we 
hold the work week constant from 2014 onwards. 
6.  The work-age population follows Eurostat projections. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 provide graphic illustrations of how our assumptions translate 
into Euro Area aggregate labour market outcomes. The reduction in the 
unemployment rate leads to a temporary increase in total employment up to 
2020 before demographic patterns reassert themselves and produce a gradual 
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decline in employment from there onwards. Our assumption about a constant 
work week for employees means the projection for hours worked roughly 
parallels that for employment with an average annual growth rate of 0.38 per 
cent per annum up to 2020 followed by declines in subsequent decades. Figure 5 
illustrates the assumptions for TFP growth and the investment share of GDP with 
the Euro Area assumed to move towards its average investment rate of the 
period 1998-2007. 
 
Putting these figures together, we project that output per hour will grow at an 
average rate of 0.49 per cent over the period 2014-2023 while GDP will grow at 
an average rate of only 0.60 per cent per year because of declining hours worked 
(see Figure 6). After this decade, output per hour is projected to grow in the 
subsequent decades at average rates of 0.71 per cent in 2024-2033 (declining 
employment leads to a temporary boost via a capital deepening effect), 0.52 per 
cent in 2034-2043, and 0.4 per cent in 2044-2053 as this rate gradually eases 
towards its steady-state value of 0.3 per cent. With falling hours worked, Euro 
Area GDP grows at 0.21 per cent per year in 2023-2033. The decline in hours 
growth tails off in subsequent decades, thus allowing total GDP growth to settle 
down at about 0.28 per cent per year despite declining productivity growth. 
 
5. Concluding Comments 
Despite the need for the Euro Area to return to faster rates of economic growth 
to deal with severe balance sheet problems affecting many of its members, the 
current set of supply-side trends are not at all encouraging for the growth 
prospects over the medium- and long-term. TFP growth is very poor, investment 
is low and demographic problems are going to restrain the growth of labour input 
in the coming years. Combined with a series of demand-side problems, such as 
tight fiscal policy and restrictions on bank credit, the prospects for the Euro Area 
economy over the next decade do not look so good.  
 
Indeed, even allowing for a return of investment and unemployment to pre-crisis 
levels, we project growth in the Euro Area that is well below one per cent over 
the next decade. In this sense, despite the intense focus on debt levels, the Euro 
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Area is facing a growth crisis as much as it is facing a debt crisis, with the latter 
perhaps more a symptom of the former. 
 
The Euro Area’s current ratio of public debt to GDP is high by modern historical 
standards at 95 per cent but many of its Member States are able to borrow at 
very low rates and the pricing of ESM-issued securities shows that there are few 
concerns about the solvency of the Euro Area as a whole. There is thus a strong 
economic case for a large investment programme aimed at reducing 
unemployment and raising the supply capacity of the economy, funded by the 
Euro Area as a whole. Given that public capital funding is usually the first item 
slashed when governments cut back on spending in a crisis, it is likely that many 
of the projects funded by such an initiative involve spending that will need to be 
undertaken at some time in the future anyway so a programme of this sort may 
have limited long-run effects on debt levels. Unfortunately, Europe’s political 
constraints are likely to rule out such a programme for the foreseeable future. 
 
Over the longer-term, Europe needs a plan for dealing with a pattern of 
population ageing that is set to have enormous effects. Policy initiatives to delay 
retirement ages and to encourage labour force participation are undoubtedly 
part of the solution to the problems posed by ageing. However, these initiatives 
are likely to be very unpopular politically and may have negative implications for 
productivity. A policy of large planned increases in the amount of immigration 
into the EU, while also politically challenging, may turn out to be the only way to 
keep the European economy expanding in the future.  
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TABLE 1  Decomposition of Euro Area and US Output Growth Rates (%) 
 
Euro Area United States 
Period Δy Δa Δk Δl Δy Δa Δk Δl 
1970-1976 3.6 2.7 1.5 -0.5 3.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 
1977-1986 2.1 1.6 0.8 -0.4 3.1 0.7 1.2 1.2 
1987-1996 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0 2.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 
1997-2006 2.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 3.1 0.9 1.6 0.7 
2007-2013 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7 -0.2 
   
      
2000-2013 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.7 0.5 1.1 0.2 
2010-2013 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.5 2.1 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan. Demographics and the Growth Outlook for Europe. ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
Notes:  The table shows the contribution of growth in labour inputs, capital inputs and TFP to total output growth, where Δa 
 denotes change in TFP; Δk denotes change in capital inputs; Δl denotes change in labour inputs and Δy denotes change in 
 total output growth. 
 
TABLE 2  Decomposition of Growth in Hours Worked (%) 
 Euro Area 
Period Total Pop. P. Rate Emp. Rate Work Week 
1970-1976 -0.8 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -1.0 
1977-1986 -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.5 -0.8 
1987-1996 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 
1997-2006 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 -0.4 
2007-2013 -0.9 0.3 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 
   
   
2000-2013 0.0 0.5 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
2010-2013 -0.8 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 
      
 
United States 
Period Total Pop. P. Rate Emp. Rate Work Week 
1970-1976 1.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 
1977-1986 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.0 -0.1 
1987-1996 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
1997-2006 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 
2007-2013 -0.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 
      
2000-2013 0.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
2010-2013 1.4 0.7 -0.4 0.8 0.2 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan. Demographics and the Growth Outlook for Europe. ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
Notes:  Pop. refers to changes in population, P. denotes participation; EMP. denotes employment; and Work Week refers to change 
 in average work week hours. 
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FIGURE 1 Determinants of Euro Area Hours Growth: 1970-2013  
 
Source:  AMECO. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Euro Area Demographic Changes 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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Figure 3 Labour Market Assumptions
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
 
Figure 4 Labour Supply (Millions)
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
 
Figure 5 Investment and TFP Assumptions
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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Figure 6 Output Growth Rates
 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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